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Mens Rea Reform as a Demand-
Side Solution to the Problem of 
Sex Trafficking 
Daniel Michael Criswell* 
Trafficking in persons has existed around the world for 
many years, yet the United States has only begun to take this 
modern form of slavery seriously in the last two decades. The 
nature of sex trafficking has caused confusion for the United 
States and others around the globe regarding how to best deal 
with the commercial sex industry. The failure to reduce the 
commercial sex industry through traditional means of 
prosecuting the traffickers and their victims has motivated 
Sweden, and consequently the United States, to pursue a 
different strategy: reducing the demand through the prosecution 
of the buyers of commercial sex. While this infant strategy has 
yet to produce any results, all is not lost. The United States 
must reform the statute’s mental state requirement and lower 
the burden prosecutors bear in trafficking cases. 
 
* Daniel Michael Criswell is a 2019 J.D. candidate at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law and Executive Articles Editor for the 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 
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Introduction 
In February 2011, a man named Mr. Jungers responded to an 
online advertisement for sex with a child in Sioux Falls, South 
Dakota.1 Jungers and the anonymous seller negotiated the transaction 
through a number of emails, detailing the age and rate for the girl.2 
After traveling to Sioux Falls, Jungers entered the house to pick up 
his reservation, but the girl was not there—the police were.3 The 
officers arrested Jungers and charged him with attempted commercial 
sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1594.4 At trial, 
Jungers argued that he was not culpable under the statute because he 
was a mere consumer of commercial sex acts and not a “trafficker.”5 
The jury found him guilty.6 Soon after, however, the district judge 
 
1. United States. v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 2013).  
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 1068. 
4. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 1594 (2015). 
5. Jungers, 702 F.3d at 1068. 
6. Id. 
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acquitted Jungers, reasoning that “the purpose of § 1591 is to punish 
sex traffickers and that Congress did not intend to expand the field of 
those prosecuted under that statute to those who purchase sex made 
available by traffickers.”7 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed 
the issue of whether § 1591 applies to both suppliers and buyers of 
commercial sex acts.8 The Court found, through the plain language of 
the statute, that nothing in the text itself suggests Congress’s intent 
to exclude purchasers, and therefore § 1591 applies to both sellers and 
buyers of commercial sex.9 This expansive interpretation opened the 
door for new strategies regarding federal and state prosecutions in sex 
trafficking.  
This Note will explore the two most culpable parties involved in 
sex trafficking—the party forcing another to engage in sex acts, and 
the party paying for the sex acts—and compare the effectiveness of 
prosecutions aimed at those parties. Part I will explore the 
background of sex trafficking as well as the international and 
domestic efforts to solve the problems of sex trafficking. Part II will 
analyze the prosecution of the seller of trafficking victims and discuss 
the barriers to convictions under domestic trafficking statutes. Part 
III will analyze the recent trend to prosecute the buyer of commercial 
sex, and will critique the construction of federal and state trafficking 
statutes. Finally, Part IV will analyze mens rea reform opportunities, 
and advocate for a standard of negligence with the hope to increase 
conviction rates of traffickers in the United States.  
I.  Understanding Human Trafficking 
Sex trafficking is a subset of human trafficking10 in which human 
beings are coerced into sexual exploitation against their will.11 A 2004 
report estimated between 600,000 and 800,000 people were trafficked 
 
7. Id. (emphasis added). 
8. Id. at 1069. 
9. Id. 
10. The term “human trafficking” is a term of art that represents the 
modern slavery of human beings in the commercial sex trade, 
manufacturing, agriculture, domestic servitude, and other industries. See 
What is Human Trafficking?, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/ blue-campaign/what-human-trafficking 
[https://perma.cc/Z2DW-UQW3] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018) (defining 
and explaining human trafficking). 
11. Sex Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/human-
trafficking/sex-trafficking [https://perma.cc/2F2Z-CJ96] (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2018). 
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worldwide in 2003,12 which explains the staggering estimate of 20.9 
million people currently in bondage because of trafficking.13 Although 
these numbers are often controversial because of the “complexity 
involved in making accurate assessments,”14 as well as the secretive 
and illegal nature of the industry,15 trafficking is a global issue. Many 
countries have laws to combat human trafficking, but little progress 
has been made to overcome it.16 
Vulnerabilities within society, such as poverty, political 
instability, and the existence of marginalized groups, combined with 
the ongoing demand for cheap labor and commercial sex, contribute 
to the transnational harm of human trafficking.17 Victims of human 
trafficking around the world are subjected to serious injury, namely 
high levels of physical and psychological harm.18 One report on the 
physical and psychological impacts on women and adolescents 
trafficked into Europe found that ninety-five percent of victims had 
been physically assaulted or coerced into a sexual act while being 
trafficked.19  Other victims had confirmed mental health problems—
anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and depression—that continued long 
after being rescued from extreme environments.20 
 
12. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 23 (2004), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34158.pdf 
[https://perma.cc /9NRH-Z9XP] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
13. Human Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, 
https://polarisproject.org/human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/R7U4-
WSQ2] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
14. David R. Hodge, Sexual Trafficking in the United States: A Domestic 
Problem with Transnational Dimensions, 53 SOCIAL WORK 143, 144 
(2008) (“[V]ictims may believe that social services providers will not 
take their claims seriously, that the police will charge them for some 
offense, or that the authorities are unable to protect them from 
traffickers’ reprisals . . . . [I]n some nations, police collude with 
traffickers, returning those who escape to their former exploiters in the 
sex or prostitution industry.”). 
15. Vanessa Baird, Trafficked, NEW INTERNATIONALIST (Sept. 1, 2007), 
https://newint.org/features/2007/09/01/keynote 
[https://perma.cc/USA2-PJRF].  
16. ALISON SISKIN & LIANA SUN WYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R34317, 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9-10 
(2013). 
17. Id. at 8-9. 
18. Baird, supra note 15. 
19. Id. (reporting gruesome injuries such as being kicked while pregnant, 
having heads slammed into doors and floors, being hit with bats, being 
punched in the face, and being burned with cigarettes).  
20. Id. 
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But how do individuals get caught up in the vicious industry of 
sex trafficking in the first place? Sex traffickers lure individuals into 
the industry through a number of techniques.21 For example, members 
of organized crime rings may take women off the streets and sell them 
to traffickers.22 In these instances, the victims are typically drugged 
and kidnapped, not knowing where they are or whom they are with.23 
In other instances, traffickers induce their victims by making false 
promises of employment.24 These “employment scams” occur in 
various forms of “prosperous opportunities,” including working as a 
maid, dancing at clubs, or modeling.25 Sometimes victims even agree 
to go to another country with the expectation they will be involved in 
the sex industry,26 but despite their initial consent to sex work, they 
are subsequently forced into sexual activity to which they had not 
agreed, nor would have, if presented with the truth beforehand.27   
II.  Prosecuting the Sellers and Obstacles to 
Overcome 
A.  A History of International Trafficking Laws 
Until recently, policymakers have made limited efforts to combat 
the problem of sex trafficking.28 Internationally, the trafficking of 
women and children has existed for many years,29 but it was only first 
brought to light in 1904 in the International Agreement for the 
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic.30 Almost fifty years went by 
before the United Nations addressed human trafficking in the 1949 
 
21. See April Rieger, Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex Trafficking Victims in the United 
States, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 231, 235-236 (2007) (illuminating the 
different techniques used by traffickers to obtain victims). 
22. Id. at 236. 
23. Id. 
24. Id.  
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 237.  
27. Id. For example, a Russian-American trafficker recruited a Latvian 
woman to work in a sophisticated nightclub in Chicago as a bikini 
dancer for $60,000 a year. When she arrived, the traffickers took away 
her passport and forced her to dance topless or nude to repay the 
unknown debt she was “charged” for her entry into the United States. 
Id.  
28. SISKIN, supra note 16, at 9. 
29. Michelle Jeffs, Punishing Pimps and Johns: Sex Trafficking and Utah’s 
Laws, 28 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 219, 226 (2013).  
30. Id.; International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave 
Traffic, May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83.  
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Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others,31 and still another fifty 
years passed before the United Nations presented the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children,32 which introduced a new and comprehensive 
definition of human trafficking:  
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.33  
Past treaties recognized the problem of trafficking, but the 
Protocol was the first to provide a broad definition of trafficking.34 It 
was also the first instrument to address all facets of human 
trafficking, including the prevention of trafficking, protection of 
victims, and punishment of offenders.35 It simultaneously laid the 
foundation for the creation of a federal trafficking law in the United 
States.36  
B.  Trafficking Laws in the United States 
In 1910, Congress passed the Mann Act, which aimed to prevent 
the transportation of human beings across state or international lines 
for the purpose of prostitution or other immoral acts.37 However, 
Congress did not respond to the increasing epidemic of human 
 
31. Laura L. Shoaps, Room for Improvement: Palermo Protocol and the 
Trafficking Victims Act, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 931, 936-37 (2013) 
(explaining that the Convention had a limited focus on the trafficking of 
women for sex, and failed to address the extent to which trafficking 
occurred outside the realm of sex, specifically, for example, in labor).  
32. G.A. RES. 55/25, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Nov. 15, 2000). 
33. Id. at Annex I, Article 3.  
34. Shoaps, supra note 31, at 933. 
35. Cindy Braspenning, Human Trafficking in the Netherlands: The 
Protection of and Assistance to Victims in Light of Domestic and 
International Law and Policy, 17 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
329, 351 (2006). 
36. Shoaps, supra note 31, at 933-4. 
37. Jeffs, supra note 29, at 229-30. 
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trafficking again until 2000 with the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act (TVPA).38 Like the definition of human trafficking in the 
Protocol, the TVPA defined trafficking in persons to mean: 
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by 
force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to 
perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or 
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or 
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of 
force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.39   
The purpose of the TVPA was to “combat trafficking in persons, 
a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are 
predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective 
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.”40  
Traditionally in trafficking cases, the “pimps” and “johns”41 went 
without punishment because the law enforcement focused on the sex 
worker.42 Rather than protecting the victims, existing laws imposed 
severe punishment on them.43 But a new century was to bring about 
new changes, and the new TVPA remodeled that legal landscape by 
focusing on three categories: protection, prosecution, and prevention.44  
The TVPA increased protection for victims by providing  
assistance to victims of trafficking, such as providing them non-
immigrant status through T-visas so that their presence in the United 
States could aid the prosecution of their trafficker.45 Regarding 
prosecution, the TVPA authorized the United States to prosecute 
traffickers for commercial sexual exploitation and labor exploitation of 
human beings, instead of the traditional prosecution of the victims 
 
38. 22 U.S.C § 7102 (2000). The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
is one of three sections within the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as 
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7113 (2015)). 
39. 22 U.S.C § 7102(8) (2000). 
40. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2000). 
41. Jeffs, supra note 29, at 224-25. 
42. Id. at 226. 
43. Hodge, supra note 14, at 148. 
44. Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and 




45. Id.  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
Mens Rea Reform as a Demand-Side Solution 
334 
themselves.46 The TVPA authorized the United States to further 
trafficking-prevention efforts by providing assistance to countries 
around the world through research, programs, and law-drafting.47    
Over the years, Congress has expanded the TVPA’s reach 
through a number of reauthorizations.48 In 2003, Congress created a 
civil action that allowed victims to sue their traffickers in federal 
court and required the Attorney General to report annually on anti-
trafficking efforts.49 In 2005, Congress created extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the TVPA over trafficking committed overseas by 
persons employed by, or accompanying, the federal government, and 
created rehabilitative facilities for trafficking victims.50 In 2008, 
Congress changed the mens rea standard for the act of advertising 
human trafficking from a knowledge requirement to reckless disregard 
that force, fraud, or coercion would be used; imposed criminal liability 
on those who knowingly, and with intent to defraud, recruited people 
to the United States by making false representations; and criminalized 
the financial advancement resulting from participation in ventures 
that engage in trafficking.51 Finally, in 2013, Congress penalized the 
confiscation of identification documents—a common act performed by 
traffickers to isolate their victims.52 
C.  Complications of Prosecuting the Sellers  
Sex trafficking first became a federal crime under the TVPA,53 
and as mentioned previously, the TVPA shifted prosecutorial focus 
from victims to traffickers.54 Consequently, the TVPA forced 
prosecutors to adjust to the new policy, producing low prosecution 
rates despite an increase in the rate between 2001 and 2008.55 Since 
then, the number of successful prosecutions has increased 
dramatically, with the Department of Justice (DOJ) reporting federal 
 
46. Id.  
47. Id.  
48. Id.  




53. John Elrod, Note, Filling the Gap: Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation 
to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 VAND. L. REV. 961, 968 (2015). 
54. See id. at 967 (highlighting the TVPA’s focus on “prosecuting 
traffickers” while “protecting human trafficking victims.”). 
55. See id. at 970 (highlighting how despite a percentage increase in human 
trafficking prosecutions, prosecutions were already low before so the 
increase is not indicative of effectiveness). 
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convictions of 297 traffickers in 2015 alone, a record high.56 Still, 
former Attorney General Loretta Lynch has recognized that “there is 
much work left to do”57 if the United States would like to make its 
mark on trafficking.58  
Nevertheless, Ms. Lynch’s hopes of significant progress may be 
out of reach due to the difficulties prosecutors face when utilizing the 
TVPA. First, the TVPA does not criminalize all acts related to 
commercial sexual activities.59 Section 1591 of the United States Code 
only criminalizes “severe sex trafficking” where force, fraud, or 
coercion is present.60 Consequently, prostitution without the presence 
of force, fraud, or coercion is not a crime under the TVPA.61 This 
leads to the second issue, where experts believe that the requirement 
to show force, fraud, or coercion renders the TVPA essentially 
ineffective.62 To emphasize this point, research shows prosecutors 
often use the Mann Act over the TVPA because the prosecutors are 
not required to prove the use of force, fraud, or coercion.63 
The difficulty of proving force, fraud, and coercion under the 
TVPA often ties the prosecutor’s hands and has forced some 
 
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS AND ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO 
COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 63 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/page/file/870826/download 
[https://perma.cc/M7NT-ZGVQ]. 
57. Id. at 130. 
58. Reports estimate that 4.5 million people have been sex trafficked, and 
17,500 foreign nationals are trafficked annually into the United States. 
Elrod, supra note 53, at 962. 
59. Elrod, supra note 53, at 968. 
60. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2000). 
61. Elrod, supra note 53, at 968; but cf. John Philip Jenkins, Prostitution, 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/prostitution 
[https://perma.cc/33VV-MGBS] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018) (explaining 
prostitution is still illegal in most of the United States, minus a few 
counties in Nevada). 
62. See Norma Ramos, Addressing Domestic Human Trafficking, 6 U. ST. 
THOMAS L. J. 21, 23 (2008) (highlighting how the Coalition Against 
Trafficking in Women (CATW) believes the TVPA falls short and 
advocates for correcting this issue). 
63. See Elrod, supra note 53, at 969 (“The Mann Act is often used to 
prosecute pimps in sex trafficking cases because the prosecutors are not 
required to prove the use of force, fraud, or coercion.”); see generally 18 
U.S.C.A. § 2422(a) (2006) (showing that the Mann Act reads, “Whoever 
knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to travel 
in interstate or foreign commerce . . . to engage in prostitution . . . or 
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 20 years, or both.”). 
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prosecutors to move forward only in “slam dunk”64 cases.65 Although 
prosecutors realize the law does not require all three elements to be 
met, they generally like to have all present to protect the case on 
appeal should one element be disproven.66 A study on the three 
elements showed that prosecutors considered force the easiest to prove 
because physical evidence, such as photographs of abuse, was easier to 
obtain than other evidence.67 Prosecutors believed fraud was a bit 
harder to prove, but acknowledged working on cases where a contract 
had been signed by the victim to do “work” in modeling, music 
videos, or domestic work.68 Unsurprisingly, prosecutors cited coercion 
as the most difficult to prove because of its ambiguous and “mushy” 
nature.69 
Prosecutors have found other issues, too.70 Lack of departmental 
resources has caused prosecutors to sometimes hand-pick the 
promising cases,71 and limited funds and a low count of personnel with 
expertise in prosecution under the TVPA compounds the issue.72 
Several U.S. Attorneys even mentioned their jurisdiction’s limitations 
 
64. AMY FARRELL, ET AL., IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO IMPROVE THE 
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF STATE AND LOCAL HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING CASES 198 (2012), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238795.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/84E5-7EJ9] (describing “slam dunk” cases as cases 
“[w]here you have more than one cooperating victim, or witnesses, and . 
. . corroborating evidence all meets . . . [I]t’s handed to you on a silver 
platter. And so all the ducks are in a line; you’ve got your victims, 
witnesses. They’re all cooperators, they’ll all go before the grand jury 
and say X, Y and Z. You’ve got hotel receipts, you’ve got . . . medical 
records, you’ve got . . . pictures of injuries, you’ve got loaded guns, 
you’ve got the smoking gun from the grassy knoll . . . [T]hey want it all 
pretty.”). 
65. Elrod, supra note 53, at 971. 
66. FARRELL, ET AL., supra note 64, at 204. 
67. Id. at 205. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See id. (prosecutors find the federal human trafficking laws complicated 
and ambiguous because of how the statute is written and unclear legal 
standards). 
71. Id. at 199. 
72. See id. at 201 (explaining that “if you have lack of personnel and no 
dedicated personnel, then they can’t take every little case and try to run 
it down. They have to, you know, prioritize.”); see also id. at 206 
(explaining that because prosecuting attorneys feel uncomfortable with 
the trafficking statute, they try to use other charges). 
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caused them to prioritize and focus solely on the trafficking of 
juveniles.73   
Finally, prosecutors admitted to rejecting some claims because 
detrimental harms caused early on in the investigation left the 
prosecutors with little to no workable evidence.74 “It would be helpful 
to have a uniform policy on how to deal with these cases on the local 
level so the cases are not damaged before they get to the federal side. 
The first 24-48 hours are critical.”75 Consequently, federal prosecutors 
have told law enforcement to treat the crime scene more carefully and 
to collect hard evidence such as condoms from the trash, hotel 
receipts, and cash—all items that might help validate the victim’s 
testimony in court.76 Due to prosecutorial difficulty in winning 
trafficking cases under the TVPA regime, policymakers’ reform efforts 
have shifted to a focus on the “demand side” of sex trafficking.    
III.  The JVTA Amendment and a Proposal for a 
Uniform State Trafficking Statute 
The relationship between buyers and sellers in a commercial sex 
transaction stems from simple economics. All things equal, the point 
where the highest price a buyer is willing to pay meets the lowest 
price the seller is willing to sell is called the market price.77 The 
market price may change according to the number of buyers in the 
marketplace, or as a result of a complete demand curve shift.78 A 
demand curve shift to the left or right represents a change in the 
buyer’s preferences.79 Specifically, a higher desirability of the good 
shifts the demand curve to the right, resulting in a larger demand of 
 
73. See id. at 199 (admitting that a prosecutor’s department only took cases 
involving children). 
74. Id. at 199-200. 
75. Id. at 200. 
76. Id. at 213. 




B6Z2] (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 




four-step-process-cnx [https://perma.cc/8UKK-B2NM] (last visited 
Sept, 28, 2018). 
79. David Sarokin, What Causes the Demand Curve to Shift to the Left?, 
CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/causes-demand-curve-shift-left-
15857.html [https://perma.cc/PY4V-3KQD] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
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that good at any given price.80 Alternatively, a demand curve shift to 
the left indicates the buyer’s desire for the market good is less, 
resulting in fewer items demanded at a given price.81 To entice more 
demand, sellers may lower their prices, which has the effect of 
eliminating suppliers from the market because those sellers will be 
unwilling to enter their goods into that market at the lower price.  
Apply this same analysis to sex trafficking, where one can see that 
a buyer’s desirability for commercial sex has a clear and direct impact 
on the number of victims in the marketplace.82 Higher buyer 
desirability increases demand, and consequently, drives more victims 
into the marketplace. Less desirability decreases demand and moves 
victims out of the marketplace because suppliers are unwilling to sell. 
All else being equal, without any buyers, or alternatively, a low 
amount of them, profitability in the commercial sex industry would 
likely diminish and suppliers would have no incentive to participate. 
Thus, prosecuting buyers is a legitimate solution to the problem of 
trafficking.83  
A. The JVTA Amendment to the TVPA 
A court of the United States first convicted a buyer under the 
TVPA in 2011 in U.S. v. Jungers.84 The Court reasoned that the 
TVPA applies to anyone who “knowingly . . . recruits, entices, 
harbors, transports, provides, obtains or maintains [a child] by any 
means” and ruled that Jungers knowingly obtained a trafficked person 
for the purpose of sex.85 A staff attorney with the National District 
Attorneys Association’s National Center for Prosecution of Child 




82. See Donna M. Hughes, Combating Sex Trafficking: A Perpetrator-
Focused Approach, 6 U. OF ST. THOMAS L. J. 28, 38–40 (2008) (noting 
that demand for victims is “the driving force of sex trafficking”). 
83. For a non-economic analysis as to the culpability of buyers, see Heather 
C. Gregorio, Note, More Than “Johns,” Less Than Traffickers: In 
Search of Just and Proportional Sanctions for Buyers of Sex with 
Trafficking Victims, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 626, 649 (2015) (saying that 
“[o]ften [buyers] will cause the most egregious harm to a sex-trafficking 
victim -- raping, sexually and physically abusing, or demeaning and 
objectifying him or her.”); see also Norma Hotaling & Leslie Levitas-
Martin, Increased Demand Resulting in the Flourishing Recruitment 
and Trafficking of Women and Girls: Related Child Sexual Abuse and 
Violence Against Women, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 117, 123 (2002) 
(reporting that while 93% of minors in prostitution were beaten by a 
john, just over half reported being regularly beaten by their pimp). 
84. United States v. Junger, 701 F.3d at 1067, 1076. 
85. Id. at 1075. 
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trafficking, saying, “[T]he Court took a very important step towards 
ending the commercial sex trade . . . .”86 Yet Jungers remains an 
anomaly as few cases have been brought against buyers since the 
decision.87 
Congress passed the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act 
(JVTA) in 2015, intending to make demand-side prosecutions easier.88 
Among other things, the JVTA revised § 1591 to clarify that buyers 
may be charged with sex trafficking by “patroniz[ing]” or “solicit[ing]” 
victims of trafficking.89 According to the legislative history, Congress 
intended to affirm the Jungers opinion that “criminals who purchase 
sexual acts from human trafficking victims may be arrested, 
prosecuted, and convicted as sex trafficking offenders when this is 
merited by the facts of a particular case.”90 The rest of this Note will 
analyze the elements of § 1591 and state trafficking laws, honing in on 
the effectiveness of the JVTA and the difficulties prosecutors may 
face as they attempt to prosecute buyers of trafficked sex.  
1. In or Affecting Interstate Commerce 
Section 1591 of Title 18 of the United States Code, often cited as 
the federal trafficking statute, and amended as of 2015, reads, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) Whoever knowingly-- 
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 
recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a 
person; or 
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from 
participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described 
in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or, except where the act 
constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in 
 
86. Kevin M. Ryan, Blog, Federal Court: If You Buy a Girl You’re a Sex 
Trafficker, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2014), 
https://www.huffingtonpost. com/kevin-m-ryan/federal-court-sex-
trafficking_b_4906848.html [https://perma.cc/7W56-99WZ]. 
87. See Ann Wagner & Rachel Wagley McCann, Prostitutes or Prey? The 
Evolution of Congressional Intent in Combating Sex Trafficking, 54 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 701, 750-51 (2017) (demonstrating the confusion 
prosecutors face when deciding how to charge and handle cases against 
buyers, despite Jungers). 
88. Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 
Stat. 227. 
89. Wagner, supra note 87, at 751. 
90. 161 CONG. REC. S1533-01, at S1536 (2015). 
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reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of 
force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any 
combination of such means will be used to cause the person to 
engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not 
attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection 
(b).91 
In 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit considered the interstate commerce element of § 1591 in 
United States v. Baston.92 In Baston, the appellant-trafficker argued 
that his trafficking of the victim was not “in or affecting” interstate 
commerce.93 The Court argued that “in commerce” refers to the 
“channels” and “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce.94  It 
concluded, citing other circuit Court cases that held similarly,95 that 
communicating by phone, text, or Instagram; convincing the victim to 
cross state lines on a bus; advertising her services on Backpage.com; 
and staying with the victim at hotels was sufficient proof that his 
conduct was “in commerce.”96  The Court also argued that even if the 
trafficking occurred exclusively in one state, a defendant whose illegal 
acts occur intrastate “still acts ‘in commerce’ if he ‘uses the channels 
or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to facilitate their 
commission.’”97  The defendant’s use of phones, the internet, hotels, 
and buses facilitated the trafficking of his victim, and thus his 
conduct was “in commerce.”98   
Next, “affecting interstate commerce” refers to the term of art 
that “ordinarily signal[s] the broadest permissible exercise of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power”99 and reaches “purely local activities that 
are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial 
 
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2015). 
92. United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 660 (11th Cir. 2016). 
93. Id. at 663. 
94. Id. at 664. 
95. See id. (citing United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d 1237, 1246 (11th Cir. 
2012) (cell phone, interstate bus travel); United States. v. Evans, 476 
F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007) (hotels that serve interstate travelers); 
United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(internet)). 
96. Id. 
97. Baston, 818 F.3d at 664. 
98. Id. 
99. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003). 
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effect on interstate commerce.”100 The Court explained that “sex 
trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion—even when it occurs ‘solely in 
Florida’—’ha[s] the capacity when considered in the aggregate . . . to 
frustrate Congress’s broader regulation of interstate and foreign 
economic activity.’”101 Congress has broad powers to pursue traffickers 
under the federal statute, and therefore very little will be out of its 
reach when applying the first element. 
2. Actus Reus 
A criminal statute traditionally has two main parts: the act itself, 
in Greek called the actus reus, and the mental state of the actor, 
known as the mens rea.102 The broad application of § 1591 covers 
many participants in a trafficking scheme. Understanding that a 
victim may change hands from the initial enticement or capture to 
final sale, Congress criminalized all stages of the supply chain.103 
Individuals that recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, or obtain 
other people as trafficking victims play an essential and harmful role 
in the success of sex trafficking, and therefore Congress legitimately 
labeled each actor as a contributing supplier and trafficker.104 
Recently, through the passage of the JVTA, Congress added two 
new culpable conducts, “solicits” and “patronizes,” to § 1591(a)(1).105 
By adding these actions to the statute, Congress gave prosecutors 
clear permission to target the buyers of commercial sex.  
Not only does the statute criminalize the sale and purchase of 
trafficked sex, § 1591(a)(2) assigns culpability to third-party 
individuals and businesses that benefit financially from a venture that 
 
100. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (interpreting the broad 
range of power given to Congress under the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution). 
101. Baston, 818 F.3d at 665 (quoting United States v. Evans, 476 F. 3d 
1176, 1179 (2007)). 
102. Actus Reus, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/actus_reus [https://perma.cc/7KVW-
MJCW] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2015). 
104. Id. 
105. According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, to “patronize” means “to be 
a frequent or regular customer or client of. Patronize, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/patronize https://perma.cc/9C6X-PGRN] (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018). “Solicit” means “to entice or lure especially into 
evil,” or “to proposition (someone) especially as or in the character of a 
prostitute,” or “to try to obtain by usually urgent requests or pleas.” 
Solicit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/solicit [https://perma.cc/FUA9-953R] (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
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has engaged in sex trafficking.106 Section (e) broadly defines a 
“venture” as “any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, 
whether or not a legal entity.”107 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit addressed some confusion surrounding this definition in 
United States v. Afyare.108 In that case, the government contended 
that § 1591(a)(2) contained four distinct elements: The defendant (1) 
must know or recklessly disregard that members of a venture sex 
traffic an adult by means of force, fraud, or coercion; (2) must 
knowingly benefit (3) from participation in that venture, regardless of 
its stated or other purpose; and (4) someone in that venture must 
engage in sex trafficking.109 Put simply, the government argued that 
although the defendant had no direct involvement in the sex 
trafficking scheme, he benefited from being a part of a venture in 
which some individuals connected to that venture took part in sex 
trafficking.110 The Court found this bystander-interpretation to be 
incorrect.111 Instead, the Court concluded that § 1591(a)(2) targets 
those who participate in a sex trafficking venture by “commit[ting] 
some ‘overt act’ that furthers the sex trafficking aspect of the 
venture.”112 
Last year, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard a case 
in which the plaintiff-victim brought a claim against her trafficker, a 
 
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2015). 
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(6) (2015). 
108. 632 F. App’x 272 (6th Cir. 2016). 
109. Id. at 285.  The Court presents the following hypothetical to illustrate 
the government’s interpretation of the statute: The defendant joins a 
soccer team with some sex traffickers, who sponsor the team 
financially.  The traffickers do not hide the source of the sponsorship, 
such that defendant knows, or recklessly disregards such knowledge, 
that his teammates are engaged in sex trafficking.  Under the 
government’s interpretation, the defendant could be prosecuted under 
the statute because (1) he knows or recklessly disregards such knowledge 
that members of his venture (the team) sex traffic, (2) he knowingly 
benefits (3) from participation on the venture (team), and (4) someone 
on his team is engaged in trafficking. Id. at 286.  
110. Id. at 286. 
111. Id. The district court applied, and the Sixth Circuit confirmed, a three-
element version where “[t]he defendant (1) must know or recklessly 
disregard that members of a venture either sex traffic an adult by means 
of force, threats, or coercion, or sex traffic a child; and (2) must 
knowingly benefit (3) from participation in that sex-trafficking venture.” 
Id at 285. 
112. Id. at 286. In the soccer player hypothetical, the Court argued that 
playing on the same soccer team with traffickers was irrelevant, and the 
defendant would not be culpable unless the prosecution proved that the 
defendant engaged in some aspect of the sex trafficking along with his 
teammates. Id. at 286. 
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hotel owner, and the two hotel operators.113 Here, the trafficker 
enticed the victim to meet him and took her captive against her 
will.114 The trafficker kept the victim at a hotel, with which he had 
prior commercial dealings.115 On one occasion specifically, the 
trafficker and one of the hotel operators exchanged high-fives in the 
parking lot and spoke about “getting this thing going again” after the 
trafficker informed the operator about the victim.116 At trial, the 
defendant-operators admitted that they were a financial beneficiary 
from the trafficking, but said they had never personally groomed or 
coerced any of the victims.117 The Court reversed the district court’s 
order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss.118 Now the 
prosecutor must prove, in tandem with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Afyare, that the hotel operators were not merely third-party 
beneficiaries, but committed an overt act that contributed to the 
supply chain.119 Fortunately, the prosecutor has evidence that the 
operator had, on at least one occasion, opened the hotel’s gates to 
allow the victims to bring back customers.120  
3. Mens Rea 
Mens rea is the most important, and often the most difficult, 
element of a crime to establish.121 The term mens rea refers to “the 
particular mental state provided for the definition of the offense.”122 In 
the United States, each jurisdiction has the police power to decide 
which mens rea to attach to each individual crime in its criminal 
statutes.123 The Model Penal Code recognizes four traditional mens  
113. Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017). 
114. Id. at 555.  
115. Id.  
116. Id. On other occasions, one of the operators ignored the victim’s cry for 
help in escaping the trafficker’s custody, and showed “indifference” to 
the victim’s “obvious physical deterioration” when she saw her. Id.  
117. Louisiana Motel Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louisiana-motel-owner-pleads-guilty-
sex-trafficking-case [https://perma.cc/R44B-2ND8]. 
118. Ricchio, 853 F.3d at 558. 
119. Afyare, 632 Fed. Appx at 286. 
120. Louisiana Motel Owner Pleads Guilty in Sex Trafficking Case, supra 
note 117. 
121. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932). 
122. Rachel A. Lyons, Note, Florida’s Disregard of Due Process Rights for 
Nearly A Decade: Treating Drug Possession As A Strict Liability 
Crime, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 350, 354 (2012) (quoting JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 119 (5th ed. 2009)). 
123. Id. 
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rea standards: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.124 In 
§ 1591’s original version, Congress required a knowing standard to 
convict any person of engaging in one of the prohibited activities.125 In 
2008, Congress amended the mens rea standard to include a standard 
of reckless disregard.126 But Congress’s addition of the words “reckless 
disregard” may cause the unexperienced reader to stumble on what 
actions require a knowing standard and which require the lesser 
standard of reckless disregard. 
The first thing that strikes the reader in § 1591(a) is the word 
“knowingly.”127 Congress set out the mens rea at the forefront of the 
statute, explicitly providing that the actions taken in section (a)(1) 
were covered upon the actor’s knowledge of their doing that action.128 
The knowledge requirement here pertains only to the action of the 
defendant; not to whether the seller or buyer has knowledge that a 
victim has been sex trafficked.129 The government can easily satisfy 
this standard to prove that the defendant at least knew he was 
acting. 
§ 1591 (a)(2) contains two mens rea standards. This time, the 
mens rea applies to the defendant’s recognition of the victim’s 
status.130 Individuals that recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, 
obtain, maintain, patronize, or solicit a person while knowing that 
that person is a victim of force, fraud, or coercion are culpable under 
the statute.131 The exception to the knowing requirement in the 
statute is the actus reus of advertising—anyone that advertises a 
person in reckless disregard of the fact that force, fraud, or coercion 
will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act is 
 
124. See Kenneth W. Simmons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea 
Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. LAW 179, 180 (2003) 
(stating that the MPC limits its terms for mens rea to purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence). 
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1487 (2000). 
126. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2008, H.R. 7311, 110th Cong. § 222 (2008). 
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2015). 
128. Id.; see also United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“When an act of Congress requires knowledge of a future action, it does 
not require knowledge in the sense of certainty as to a future act. What 
the statute requires is that the defendant know in the sense of being 
aware of an established modus operandi that will in the future cause a 
person to engage [the act].”). 
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2015). 
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2015) (covering those who benefit from a 
human trafficking venture). 
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2) (2015) (outlining the punishments for those 
covered by this statute). 
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culpable under the statute.132 This segment of the statute seems to be 
directly related to advertising sex on Backpage.com.133 
B.  State Trafficking Laws 
Before analyzing the effects of the elements of the federal sex 
trafficking statute, it is important to examine state trafficking laws as 
well. The passage of the TVPA encouraged states to pass their own 
legislation134—currently all fifty states have passed sex trafficking 
laws.135 Out of 3,969 trafficking convictions in 2011, only 151 of those 
occurred at the federal level,136 leading experts to believe that the 
battle over trafficking will be won or lost on the state front.137 Yet 
problems persist in this arena because laws vary considerably from 
state to state.138 For example, some state statutes include only sex 
trafficking and not labor trafficking, despite estimates that labor 
trafficking accounts for seventy-eight percent of trafficking globally.139 
Other state laws only address human trafficking of minors, or 
combine human trafficking laws with smuggling laws.140 To combat 
these inconsistencies, the American Bar Association Center for 
Human Rights submitted to the Uniform Law Commission a proposal 
 
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2015). 
133. For more information on sex advertisements on Backpage.com, see 
Annie Kelly, Small Ads Sex Trafficking: The Battle Against Backpage, 




134. Elrod, supra note 53, at 969. 
135. Id. 
136. Kelly Heinrich and Kavitha Sreeharsha, The State of State Human-
Trafficking Laws, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: THE JUDGES JOURNAL, 
(Jan. 31, 2013) https://www.americanbar.org/publications/judges 
_journal/2013/winter/the_state_of_state_humantrafficking_laws.html 
[https://perma. cc/5SW7-5Q25]. 
137. See Andrew Hall, Note, The Uniform Act on Prevention of and 
Remedies for Human Trafficking, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 854, 871 (2014) 
(demonstrating how more federal action has been taken to encourage 
state and local authorities to address human trafficking).  
138. Elrod, supra note 53, at 969. The Polaris Project rated every states’ 
anti-trafficking laws in 2013 and found only New Jersey, Delaware, and 
Washington to have fully satisfactory anti-trafficking laws across ten 
categories of analysis. See 2014 State Ratings on Human Trafficking 
Laws, POLARIS PROJECT, http:// polarisproject.org/resources/2014-
state-ratings-human-trafficking-laws [https://perma.cc/Y7XY-ZL9Z] 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
139. Heinrich, supra note 136. 
140. Id. 
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for a model state anti-trafficking statute.141 The ABA Center for 
Human Rights argued a uniform state law would “render the current 
patchwork of state anti-trafficking laws far more effective by 
providing a centralized ‘one-stop’ standard that most accurately 
reflects the actual criminal behavior of traffickers and avoids 
piecemeal investigations under divergent state statutes . . . .”142  
1. Actus Reus  
The ABA Center for Human Rights updated the definition of 
“human trafficking” in the Uniform Act to include “patronizing a 
victim of sexual servitude.”143 Section 6 reads, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
A person commits patronizing a victim of sexual servitude if the 
person knowingly gives, agrees to give, or offers to give anything 
of value so that an individual may engage in commercial sexual 
activity with another individual and the person knows that the 
other individual is a victim of sexual servitude.144  
Accordingly, the ABA proposed to qualify the buyers of 
commercial sex as “traffickers” even before Congress did. 
Some state legislators have used the word “obtain” in crafting 
their trafficking statutes,145 but just one court has followed the 
Jungers holding that the word “obtain” could sufficiently catch buyers 
of sex trafficking victims.146 Because only two courts have employed 
 
141. Erin N. Kauffman, The Uniform Act on Prevention of And Remedies 
for Human Trafficking: State Law and the National Response to Labor 
Trafficking, 41 J. LEGIS. 291, 310 (2015). 
142. Id. (quoting ABA CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION PROJECT PROPOSAL: UNIFORM HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAW 2 
(2010)). 
143. UNIFORM ACT ON PREVENTION OF AND REMEDIES FOR HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING § 6 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2013) [hereinafter Uniform Act]. 
144. Id. at § 6(a). 
145. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1 (West 2012) (including the word 
“obtain” in the statute); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-9 (2013) (same); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 529.110 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 50 (West 2017) (same); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. 750.462b (West Supp. 2009)(enacted 2006) (same); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.32 (West 2013) (same). 
146. See State v. Rufus, 868 N.W.2d 534, 542 (N.D. 2015) (holding that “the 
plain meaning of ’obtain’ . . . is broad enough to encompass acquiring 
temporary custody of a person for the purpose of engaging in 
commercial sex acts with that person.”). 
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this interpretation,147 the addition of “patronizing,” like the federal 
statute, clarifies any ambiguity for courts and prosecutors as to 
whether buyers are culpable under state sex trafficking statutes. State 
legislators should consider this slight modification to their statutes 
and align themselves with the federal objective to prosecute buyers.  
2. Mens Rea 
Section six of the Uniform Act is similar to § 1591 of the federal 
law. The law contains two different components, one pertaining to the 
mens rea of the action, and the other to the mens rea that concerns 
the status of the trafficked person as a victim of sexual servitude.148 
Both mens rea standards for the Uniform law are a “knowing” 
standard, similar to many current state statutes.149 Only a few states 
have stricter standards.150 
IV. Alternative Solutions: Strict Liability, Reckless, 
or Negligence? 
Unfortunately, the DOJ has had a slow start in its prosecution of 
buyers under the amended statute.151 In 2016, the DOJ submitted a 
written testimony of its progress, presenting “demand-side” cases it 
has seen in over twenty different jurisdictions;152 every one of those 
cases involved a trafficked child while none involved the purchase of 
an adult.153  
A strong reason for this shortcoming might be the knowing mens 
rea standard, where the prosecutors must prove that the buyers knew 
the victims they purchased were victims of sex trafficking. Without 
having been told any information about the victims, and without 
having seen firsthand any evidence of force, fraud, or coercion, 
 
147. See id; see also United States v. Gum, W.D.Okla. 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 151581 (Nov. 9, 2015) (finding Jungers persuasive in that § 1591 
applies to both suppliers and purchasers of commercial sex). 
148. Uniform Act, supra note 143, §6(a). 
149. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 50 (West 2017) (employing 
a knowing mens rea standard); IND. CODE § 35-42-3.1-1(2013) (same) ; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-46 (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (same); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 710A.2 (West 2014) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. 750.462b (West Supp. 2009)(enacted 2006) (same); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-3-54.1 (2013) (same); MO. ANN. STAT. 566.206 (West Supp. 
2009) (enacted 2004) (same). 
150. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1 (West 2012) (using the strictest 
mental state of intent); MINN. STAT. ANN § 609.322 (West 2015) (same). 
151. Wagner, supra note 87, at 743. 
152. Id. at 755. 
153. Id. 
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convictions under § 1591 become difficult. Additionally, any glimmer 
of a promising case is stifled because of a buyer’s “willful blindness.”154 
This knowledge-avoidance tactic protects buyers, who choose not to 
know about certain facts of the situation, from prosecution.155 
While the trafficking of children requires a knowledge element, 
the standard for prosecutors to meet is easier than in cases involving 
adult victims.156 In Jungers, the Court identified the victim as a child 
and analyzed the case through that lens. Because Jungers plainly 
indicated he wanted an eleven-year-old for sex,157 the Court most 
likely interpreted Jungers’ knowledge as a non-issue.  
The difficulty in proving knowledge in adult-victim trafficking 
cases might be solved by lowering the mens rea requirements for 
federal and state trafficking statutes. But before changing the law, 
legislators must consider what actions to criminalize and whom to 
penalize. There are two competing interests involved: effectiveness 
and fairness. The effectiveness interest looks for the best way to 
conquer the problem and disregards most other factors in an analysis, 
while the fairness interest implements solutions that do not result in 
unnecessarily disparate results or unjustifiably harsh sentences. 
A lower mental state would change the kinds of buyers that are 
prosecuted. Under the current mental state of knowledge, prosecutors 
apprehend buyers who know they are engaging a victim of sex 
trafficking, but want the commercial sex anyways. This higher mental 
state functions to catch the more depraved buyer, but only the small 
class of them, leaving out every other buyer of commercial sex that 
either does not know, or chooses not to know, the victim’s status. As 
a result, the mental state of knowledge falls somewhere in the middle 
on the effectiveness-fairness scale.  
A statute with a less stringent mental state requirement can 
capture more criminal activity because it casts a wider net. A lower 
 
154. Willful blindness is “deliberate failure to make a reasonable inquiry of 
wrongdoing (as drug dealing in one’s house) despite suspicion or an 
awareness of the high probability of its existence.” Willful Blindness, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011). 
155. See Tim Swarens, Who Buys a Trafficked Child for Sex? Otherwise 
Ordinary Men, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/opinion/nation-now/2018/01/30/sex-trafficking-column/10734590 
01/ [https://perma.cc/T4D8-C5KW] (stating that a former buyer did 
not “want to know how the sausage is made.”). 
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) (2015) (stating that “knowing…that the 
person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage 
in a commercial sex act” is punishable under the statute) but see 18 
U.S.C. §1591(c) (2015) (relieving the government from proving the 
defendant knew the victim was under 18 if the defendant had a 
“reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim). 
157. United States v. Jungers, 702 F. 3d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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mental state requirement could create culpability for buyers of 
trafficked sex that should have known, or should have been aware 
because of surrounding circumstances, that a purchased individual 
was a victim of sex trafficking. To go even further, attaching no 
mental state at all to the status of the purchased individual would 
catch every single buyer of commercial sex in its net, regardless of 
whether the buyer knew the purchased individual was sex trafficked 
or not. Some might argue this kind of statute leans heavily in favor of 
effectiveness and creates an unjust consequence for the buyer, yet sex 
trafficking’s aggregate harm may justify the severity of the 
punishment. If the United States were to eliminate the mental state 
from the federal trafficking statute for buyers, it would find itself in a 
similar position to that of Sweden.  
A.  Sweden’s Model 
On January 1, 1999, Sweden became the first country in the 
world to legalize the sale of sex and criminalize the purchase of it.158 It 
passed the law to protect commercial sex workers159 by eliminating 
the criminalization of all commercial sex work.160 In terms of the 
allocation of responsibility, the Swedes believe the purchaser and 
trafficker are both blameworthy, but that the purchaser’s impact 
fosters the abusive environment created by prostitution and 
trafficking, and thus they should be punished and required to 
compensate the victim.161 
In 1998, prior to the law’s effective date, Swedish social services’ 
prostitution groups estimated they were aware of 730 women in the 
country involved in street prostitution.162 A year after the new law’s 
implementation, street prostitution essentially disappeared.163 
Although it regained some potency a year later, a 2008 study showed 
the total number of individuals in street prostitution had decreased 
by half since 1999.164 These numbers are often compared to numbers 
 
158. Statens Offentliga Utredningar [SOU] 2010:49 Förbud mot köp av 
sexuell tjänst. En utvärdering 1999-2008 (Swed.), translated in THE BAN 
AGAINST THE PURCHASES OF SEXUAL SERVICES: AN EVALUATION 1999-
2008, 4 (Mireille L. Key & Jennifer Evans trans., Swed. Inst., Nov. 2010) 
[hereinafter SWEDISH INSTITUTE]. 
159. Max Waltman, Prohibiting Sex Purchasing and Ending Trafficking: The 
Swedish Prostitution Law, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 133, 135 (2011). 
160. SWEDISH INSTITUTE, supra note 158, at 14. 
161. Id. at 155. 
162. SWEDISH INSTITUTE, supra note 158, at 20. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. The study indicated that “[t]his reduction can be viewed as a direct 
consequence of the criminalization of buying sex.” Id. at 27. 
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in Denmark and Norway, where purchasing sex is legal.165 Based on 
evidence, researchers estimated individuals involved in prostitution in 
Sweden equaled one-tenth of those in Denmark, and one-eighth of 
those per capita in Norway.166 The National Criminal Investigation 
Department provides additional positive statistics, stating that 
telephone interceptions involving pimps have shown them to be 
“disappointed with the prostitute market in Sweden.”167 Likewise, a 
reliable self-reporting method has shown that the percentage of men 
who reported buying sex dropped from 12.7% in 1996 to 7.6% in 
2008.168 
Yet, even with positive results, there is a hesitancy to praise the 
law.169 While the law may have decreased the number of individuals 
immersed in street prostitution in Sweden, it is unknown whether 
prostitution in general has decreased.170 One theory is that the rise of 
technology and the internet has driven prostitution indoors and made 
it more difficult for law enforcement to investigate.171 Skeptics also 
question the safety of the victims that are left.172 Because lower 
demand and fewer clients cause lower prices, victims are not at liberty 
to reject potentially-harmful buyers.173 
To add another layer, Sweden finds itself in the middle of a strong 
debate over whether prostitution is inherently coercive and thus a 
form of sex trafficking. On one side, sex-work advocates believe that 
laws against prostitution infringe upon the rights of the individuals to 
choose to engage in sex work.174 Advocates argue victims of sex 
trafficking who have been forced, defrauded, or coerced into engaging 
in commercial sex are very different from individuals exercising their 
own choice to enter prostitution.175 Under this view, conflating 
prostitution with sex trafficking is disfavored.176 
 
165. Waltman, supra note 159, at 146-47. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 147. 
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169. See Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: 
Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1655, 1718 (2010) (explaining the skepticism of the Swedish law). 
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In opposition, abolitionists177 believe ending prostitution is 
“instrumentally valuable” to abolishing sex trafficking.178 The 
legalization of prostitution leads to an increase in the market demand 
for commercial sex which, in turn, creates a profit motive for pimps to 
provide those sexual services.179 To maintain their supply, pimps 
regularly engage in dangerous and destructive conduct involving force, 
fraud, or coercion.180 Thus, the industries are linked: “[A]s the 
prostitution industry as a whole goes, so goes sex trafficking.”181 
Nevertheless, despite the skepticism and debate, one thing stands 
tall: Sweden has found a way to protect commercial sex victims by 
legalizing the sale of sex and, at the same time, curve the high 
volumes of commercial sex that usually follows the legalization of it 
by strictly prosecuting those who purchase it. 
B.  An Analysis: Mens Rea Reform 
Since 2012, over 825 cities and counties in the United States have 
pursued a demand-focused campaign to stop sex trafficking.182 
However, the United States has yet to fully embrace the Swedish 
Model, which would call for two crucial changes in domestic public 
policy: the elimination of the distinction between the purchase of 
prostituted sex and the purchase of trafficked sex, and the 
decriminalization of the sale of commercial sex. Without any 
verification that prostitution is inextricably linked to sex trafficking, 
both changes would be a step backwards for the United States. 
The first problem with Sweden’s approach is that the merger of 
prostitution statutes with trafficking statutes would result in a 
purchaser-centralized statute with no mental state as to the status of 
the victim as trafficked.183 Anyone who would solicit, or patronize a  
177. In its simplest term, “abolitionist” refers to individuals that seek to 
eradicate both sex trafficking and the prostitution industry in general. 
Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In 
Defense of Feminist Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1730 (2010). 
178. Id. at 1749. 
179. Id. at 1752-53. 
180. Id. at 1753. 
181. Elrod, supra note 53, at 974. 
182. See MICHAEL SHIVELY, ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL 
OVERVIEW OF PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEMAND REDUCTION 
EFFORTS, NO. 238796, FINAL REPORT (2012) (overviewing national 
demand-focused initiatives). These initiatives are most played out 
through what is called the “reverse sting” operation, where police 
officers pose as women on the street or online to lure buyers. Gregorio, 
supra note 83, at 642. 
183. See Asaaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 415, 416-18 (2007) (discussing a background of criminal statutes 
that have no mental states, often referred to as strict liability statutes). 
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person for, commercial sex, without regard to whether the person was 
a victim of sex trafficking, would commit a crime. Under a law such 
as this, the purchase of sex with a prostitute would be equally as 
culpable as the purchase of sex with a trafficked victim. However, 
these crimes are not equal, and should not be made equal; forced, 
fraudulent, or coerced sex does not equal consensual sex. The severity 
of each crime’s punishment evidences the different levels of 
criminality in the eyes of the legislature.184 Equal punishment would 
indeed disincentivize purchasers of commercial sex to explore the 
status of the person with whom they have sex. Because sex with a 
prostitute would be equally as wrong as having sex with a trafficked 
victim, buyers would not care to ask or know the status of the person 
bought for sex. United States law and policy should instead encourage 
individuals to abstain from the purchase of sex with trafficked 
victims. Distinct punishments would encourage buyers who want to 
purchase sex to do a little due diligence, and to understand that a 
careful examination of the situation could save them fifteen years in 
prison.  
The second problem with Sweden’s approach is Congress would 
have to decriminalize the sale of commercial sex. The 
decriminalization of the sale of commercial sex has worked on the 
surface in Sweden, but the United States should refrain from 
implementing this strategy until more data surfaces about its long-
term effects. Almost two decades have passed since the United States 
started prosecuting the traffickers of commercial sex, and United 
States prosecutors have finally begun to gain some traction. Now to 
eliminate the trafficker’s culpability to pursue a relatively unproven 
strategy would foolishly pull the rug out from underneath the 
prosecutor’s feet.  
Instead of the Swedish Model, the United States should pursue a 
smaller change that still has the potential to yield a big impact. The 
federal and state trafficking statutes have not produced effective 
results because of the high mens rea standard of knowledge, so 
Congress and state legislatures should consider implementing a lower 
standard for all actus reus elements. A lower mens rea standard would 
decrease the burden shouldered by the government in proving that 
the defendant engaged in one of the prohibited actus reus and 
hopefully increase the convictions of traffickers in court. Legislatures 
would have two mens rea standards to choose from: reckless or 
negligence. 
 
184. See, e.g., O.R.C. § 2907.24 (2016) (stating that “[n]o person shall solicit 
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1. Reckless  
Criminal law generally permits a finding of recklessness when an 
individual consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the material element exists.185 At first glance, a reckless standard 
appears workable. A prosecutor would have to prove that the 
circumstances presented a risk that the person was trafficked, that the 
defendant was aware of the risk, and that the defendant disregarded 
the risk. Each case would be highly dependent upon particular facts 
and circumstances, leaving juries to evaluate the case through signs of 
trafficking emanating from the person or the situation. Fortunately, 
the Polaris Project and the Department of Health and Human 
Services say that psychological and physical signs of trafficking 
exist.186 Victims are often controlled physically or psychologically and 
cannot leave their home or workplace without supervision.187 Victims 
are often addicted to alcohol or drugs as a coping mechanism to 
escape their situation, and they may have signs of physical abuse such 
as burns, bruises, or scars.188 Finally, victims may lack knowledge 
about what city they are in or the location of where they are living.189 
Unfortunately for prosecutors, the presence of trafficking signs would 
not be enough—they would still have to establish that the defendant 
was aware of the trafficking signs. Suddenly, the reckless standard 
does not look so promising: the prosecutor is faced again with proving 
the defendant’s knowledge about certain facts of the situation. 
2. Negligence 
“I didn’t mean to do it: I just didn’t think.”190 This common 
statement emphasizes the negligence standard’s place in civil and 
 
185. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994) (citing Unif. Model 
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criminal law. Thoughtless action is not an acceptable reason to evade 
responsibility,191 and it should not prevail when individuals participate 
in the sex trafficking industry. The negligence standard would apply 
to participants in the supply chain of sex trafficking, for example 
those that transport the victims and to the buyers of trafficked sex. 
Instead of culpability only for knowledge of the fact that force, fraud, 
or coercion had been used on the victim, individuals would now be 
culpable of aiding the trafficking industry by neglecting the signs of 
trafficking. At last, willful blindness would no longer excuse anyone in 
the trafficking industry from culpability because the defendant’s 
actual perception of the risk that the victim had been trafficked 
would bear no weight on the analysis. 
A negligence mental state in § 1591 would look similar to the 
following: 
(a) Whoever knowingly-- 
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 
recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a 
person; or 
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from 
participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described 
in violation of paragraph (1), negligent to the fact that means of 
force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection 
(e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause 
the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person 
has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to 
engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b). 
According to the Model Penal Code, a person acts negligently 
with respect to an element of a criminal offense when “he should be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element 
exists or will result from his conduct.”192 Considering the 
circumstances known to the defendant, the actor’s failure to perceive 
the risk must involve a gross deviation from the standard of care that 
a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.193 Replicate 
this standard with sex trafficking where the defendant would act 
negligently if he, considering the circumstances, grossly deviated from 
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in those 
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circumstances. Thus, the prosecutor would have to prove that 
circumstances existed that presented a substantial risk that the 
person had been trafficked—for example, the victim exhibited signs of 
trafficking and the defendant grossly deviated from the way a 
reasonable person would have acted in the same circumstance.  
A negligence standard considers a reasonable person’s actions 
under similar circumstances. The reasonable person is a fictitious 
character who is never negligent and always acts according to the 
standard of care due to others around him, thus safeguarding himself 
from liability;194 he “[exercises] those qualities of attention, knowledge, 
intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for 
the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.”195 In 
conforming to the reasonable person standard, the actor is required to 
do what the ideal person would do in his place.196  
To hold a negligence standard in sex trafficking, it is necessary to 
lay out the expectation of how the ideal person would act. While this 
ideal person would change his behavior according to the 
circumstances presented (for example, if he was harboring trafficked 
individuals versus soliciting them for purchase), there are common 
behaviors that would apply to a reasonable person in the places of 
both the buyer and seller of trafficked victims. The reasonable person, 
for example, when engaged with any person who has a risk of being 
sex trafficked, would take precautions in both his behaviors and 
mental recitals to avoid culpability. He would carefully ask questions, 
such as the victim’s origins or age,197 and if the victim is aware of 
where they are. The reasonable person would be particularly 
suspicious of non-English-speaking individuals, especially ones that do 
not have any identification documents.198 The reasonable person 
would carefully scrutinize the arrangements that are made, 
recognizing that trafficking appears in certain types of 
establishments199 and victims may not be allowed to come and go 
without supervision.200 The reasonable person would observe the 
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physical appearance of the victim, if possible, to look for evidence of 
abuse, substance addiction, or marks that show branding.201 Finally, 
the reasonable person would not just be mindful upon initial 
engagement, but would remain aware throughout all interactions with 
the victim and would connect readily apparent cues where reasonable.  
To legitimize the reasonable person and the behavior that this 
person would exhibit, the federal and state governments should 
publish information about how to spot trafficked victims, or even 
further, publish who this reasonable person is. General awareness to 
the public would establish the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would take when soliciting commercial sex so as to not 
purchase trafficked sex.  
Once the reasonable person is established, the prosecution would 
bear the burden to introduce evidence that the defendant grossly 
failed to adhere to the standard of care that a reasonable person 
would have in his circumstance. To do this, the prosecutor would look 
to establish that the victim exhibited signs of trafficking, and that 
those signs were so evident that a reasonable person in the same 
circumstance would see them and disengage the victim so as to avoid 
culpability. For example, the prosecutor might want to present 
evidence of the physical features of the victim, including marks on the 
body, or the victim’s general appearance, such as the influence of 
drugs or alcohol. The prosecutor might also want to present evidence 
of communication exchanges or any mention of locations.  
Until now, most of the analysis has been evaluated with street-
level trafficking in mind. However, solicitation of commercial sex has 
shifted from street-level to online in recent years.202 While web-based 
sting operations are easy for police to initiate,203 online solicitations 
complicate the analysis because of the minimum amount of 
information exchanged between the parties and the lack of interaction 
between the buyer and the trafficked victim. The prosecutors may 
find themselves in tough positions where they are unable to produce 
quality evidence because of the impersonal nature of the online 
interaction. Nevertheless, prosecutors could overcome this obstacle by 
encouraging the police, in their sting operations, to offer up 
information to the buyer that a reasonable person would conclude 
presents a risk of sex trafficking. In addition, when the buyer and the 
officer posing as the victim are face-to-face, the officer could offer up 
additional information so as to inform the buyer of trafficking signals.  
A change in the mens rea standard for sex trafficking would not 
rid prosecutors of all difficulty. Certainly one adjustment cannot solve 
the trafficking problem. But lowering the mens rea to negligence could 
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provide prosecutors some room to work with, if not at least a fighting 
chance to secure a single federal conviction of a buyer of trafficked 
sex.  
Conclusion 
Millions of people around the world have been affected by human 
trafficking, and millions more will realize its impact as the industry 
grows every year. Different countries have utilized various strategies 
to hinder the growth of sex trafficking. Sweden legalized the sale of 
sex and criminalized the purchase of it. The United States adopted 
the TVPA to pursue the prosecution of the traffickers, and recently 
undertook a commitment to prosecute the buyers of trafficked sex. 
However, after almost two years, the prosecution of buyers remains 
elusive.  
The mens rea of knowing makes it difficult for prosecutors to get 
convictions of buyers in court because many buyers do not know that 
they are purchasing a victim of human trafficking, or alternatively, 
choose not to know. Mens rea reform to a strict liability standard as 
to the status of the person as trafficked or not would equalize the 
purchase of prostituted sex and trafficked sex, theoretically 
eliminating any incentive for the buyer to explore the status of the 
person before purchase. Mens rea reform to the standard of reckless 
would pose a difficulty similar to the current knowledge standard and 
would not expand the TVPA’s reach. A mens rea reform to the 
standard of negligence would prove most effective. With this 
standard, buyers who should have been aware of the signs of 
trafficking, to the extent that signs presented themselves in the 
situation, and performed one of the prohibited acts in the statue, 
would be culpable. Still, mens rea reform would not rid the prosecutor 
of all difficulty, but it would finally give prosecutors a standard with 
which they can work. 
 
